In 1873 Mark Twain and his Hartford neighbor Charles Dudley Warner published a satirical novel about speculators, bribed congressmen and get-rich-quick schemes. Its title, The Gilded Age, later gave its name to the whole era from the end of Reconstruction to about 1900. The joke was in the word: gilded things are covered in a thin layer of gold over something cheaper. Historians use the label for a time of astonishing growth and astonishing inequality, and they usually pair it with the Progressive Era that followed, roughly 1900 to 1920, when Americans tried to tame what the Gilded Age had built.
An economy remade by rails and steel
The engine of change was the railroad. The first transcontinental line was completed at Promontory Summit, Utah, in May 1869, and by 1900 the country had about 190,000 miles of track, more than all of Europe. Railroads created a national market, so that a Chicago meatpacker or a Minneapolis flour mill could sell everywhere. They also became the first giant corporations, with thousands of employees, complex accounts and the power to make or ruin a town by setting freight rates.
Steel followed. Andrew Carnegie, who arrived from Scotland as a poor boy and started work as a bobbin boy in a cotton mill, built his fortune through what historians call vertical integration: owning every stage of production, from iron mines and coal fields to ships, rail lines and mills. Control of each stage let him cut costs relentlessly. John D. Rockefeller took a different path in oil. His Standard Oil bought or squeezed out rival refiners, an approach called horizontal integration, and won secret rebates from railroads. By about 1880 Standard Oil refined roughly 90 percent of the oil in the United States. In 1882 its lawyers created a trust, a legal device that placed many companies under one board of trustees, and the word trust soon became shorthand for any monopoly.
Making sense of great wealth
How could such fortunes be justified in a republic that prized equality? One answer borrowed from biology. The English philosopher Herbert Spencer applied evolutionary ideas to society, and it was Spencer, not Darwin, who coined the phrase "survival of the fittest," in 1864. His American follower William Graham Sumner, a Yale professor, argued in 1883 that the classes owed each other nothing beyond fair dealing, and that aid to the poor took from the hardworking "forgotten man" who paid for it. Critics later called this outlook Social Darwinism, a label its supporters rarely used themselves.
Carnegie offered a gentler answer. In an 1889 essay later known as The Gospel of Wealth, he accepted inequality as the price of progress but insisted that the rich held their surplus as trustees for the public. He wrote that "the man who dies thus rich dies disgraced." He gave away most of his fortune and paid for more than 2,500 public library buildings around the world. Rockefeller funded the University of Chicago and medical research. Defenders of the age point to these gifts, to falling prices for kerosene, steel and food, and to real wages that rose over the period for many workers.
The case against the tycoons
Critics saw something else. Wealth was more concentrated than ever before in American history, and the men at the top often won through tactics that had little to do with efficiency: bribery of legislatures, watered stock, rebates and price wars meant to drive rivals out before prices rose again. The journalist Henry Demarest Lloyd attacked Standard Oil in 1894 in Wealth Against Commonwealth. Earlier, Henry George's Progress and Poverty (1879) asked why poverty deepened alongside progress, and proposed a single tax on land values. It sold millions of copies. Edward Bellamy's novel Looking Backward (1888), set in a cooperative Boston of the year 2000, inspired more than a hundred clubs devoted to its ideas.
The popular phrase robber barons captures the critics' view, while some historians prefer industrial statesmen, stressing organization and innovation. Most now hold that both images are partly true. The same men lowered the price of goods and crushed competitors, gave fortunes away and fought unions bitterly. What is beyond dispute is that a new kind of economic power had appeared, larger than many state governments, and the old political tools were not built to check it.
Worked example: two views from Pittsburgh
Imagine a steelworker at Carnegie's Edgar Thomson Works around 1890. He works a twelve-hour shift, often seven days a week, beside furnaces that can kill or maim in an instant. Every two weeks the day and night crews switch by working a "long turn" of twenty-four hours. His wages are higher than he could earn on a farm in Hungary or Wales, and the library Carnegie built in a nearby town is open to him, though he has little time or energy to use it.
Now imagine Carnegie reading the company accounts in New York. He sees falling costs, a world market won from British rivals and a fortune he sincerely means to give away. Each man sees something real. The worker's view shows the human cost hidden in cheap steel. Carnegie's view shows how the same system created wealth on a scale never seen before. The question that occupied Americans for the next forty years was whether the two could be reconciled: whether the gains of industry could be kept while its burdens were shared more fairly, and who should decide.
