Skip to main content

Phenomenology in Paris

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 to 1961) belonged to the generation of French philosophers who discovered Husserl and Heidegger in the 1930s. In 1945, the year he helped found the review Les Temps modernes with Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, he published Phenomenology of Perception. In 1952 he was elected to the Collège de France, and he died suddenly at 53. His great theme was something earlier phenomenologists had touched on but left in the background: the body.

The body as point of view

Science treats the body as an object among objects, made of cells and moved by muscles. Merleau-Ponty did not deny any of that. But he pointed out that the body is never only an object for me. I cannot walk around my own body and view it from all sides, as I can a table. It is always here, the place from which I see. For Merleau-Ponty, the body is the point of view through which we have a world at all. He called it the lived body or one's own body, and he described the person as a body-subject: not a mind steering a machine, but a living, perceiving body that is already intelligent.

Knowing with the body

Philosophers since Descartes had placed knowledge in the "I think". Merleau-Ponty, taking a phrase from Husserl, argued that consciousness is originally an "I can". When I reach for a glass, I do not first represent its location and then calculate a path. My hand goes to it. He called this motor intentionality: the body's practical directedness toward things, a grasp that works below the level of thought.

This grasp depends on a body schema, a lived, practical sense of the body's position and powers. It is not a mental picture. You know where your left foot is without looking, and you know you can step over a puddle but not a ditch. The schema stretches and changes with habit. Merleau-Ponty's examples are memorable. A skilled typist knows where the keys are in the hands, without being able to say where they are. An organist can adjust to an unfamiliar organ in about an hour of practice before a concert. A blind person's cane becomes part of the body, so that touch is felt at its tip, not in the palm.

The case of Schneider

Merleau-Ponty's most sustained example came from neurology. Schneider was a German soldier wounded in the back of the head by shell fragments in the First World War and studied by the psychologist Adhémar Gelb and the neurologist Kurt Goldstein. He could carry out familiar concrete movements with ease: he worked at making wallets, and he could swiftly reach the place on his body where a mosquito was biting. Yet he struggled with abstract movements on command, such as pointing to a part of his body or moving his arm when simply told to, unless he first found his way into the movement with preparatory motions of his whole body.

Merleau-Ponty argued that neither of the standard theories could explain this. If movement were mere reflex, Schneider's damage should not single out pointing. If movement were directed by intellect, his intact reasoning should have let him point. The lesson was that bodily understanding is a third thing, between reflex and thought, and that a whole world of possible action, a "space" of things to be done, depends on it.

Touching and being touched

Press your right hand against your left. Each hand touches and is touched, but you cannot feel both roles at the same instant; attention flips from one to the other. Husserl had noticed this double sensation. Merleau-Ponty made it central to his late thought, arguing that the perceiver is always also part of the perceptible world, which he called flesh.

Throwing like a girl

Merleau-Ponty wrote as if bodily experience were the same for everyone. In a celebrated 1980 essay, "Throwing Like a Girl", the political philosopher Iris Marion Young applied his ideas to women's bodily movement in societies that treat women's bodies as objects to be looked at. She described how many women experience the body as a thing to be watched as well as a capacity, which produces hesitant, inhibited movement: throwing without using the whole body, reaching less far than one could. She named this inhibited intentionality, an "I can" held back by an "I cannot". Young insisted that the cause is the social situation of women, not anatomy, and she was careful to limit her claims to particular times and places. Her essay showed both the power of phenomenology and its need for correction: the lived body is always someone's, shaped by history.

Worked example: learning to drive

A new driver works through rules: check the mirror, signal, ease off the clutch. The car feels huge and foreign, and parking is a matter of anxious calculation. A year later the same driver slips into a parking space while talking. The car's width has entered the body schema: they feel whether a gap is wide enough, much as the cane is felt at its tip. Skill has moved from explicit rules into motor intentionality.

Young's point applies too. A learner who has been told all their life that they are clumsy may drive more hesitantly than their skill warrants. Bodily confidence is learned, and it can be taught or undermined.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. For Merleau-Ponty, what is the lived body?
2. What did Merleau-Ponty mean by motor intentionality?
3. What is the body schema, as Merleau-Ponty described it?
4. What did Merleau-Ponty say about a skilled typist?
5. What happens to a blind person's cane, according to Merleau-Ponty?
6. What could Schneider not do easily after his head wound?
7. How did Iris Marion Young describe many women's experience of the body?
8. What did Young say causes inhibited intentionality?

CivilSimian.com created by AxiomaticPanic, CivilSimian, Kalokagathia