If hedonism leaves too much out, one natural move is to look beyond feelings to what people actually want. Desire-fulfilment theories hold that your life goes well to the extent that your desires are satisfied, whether or not you know or feel it. Rosa from the last level wanted a faithful husband. On this view, the second version of her life is worse because that desire went unfulfilled, even though she never found out.
Why desire theories appeal
Desire theories fit a modern, liberal instinct. They do not ask anyone to rank your pleasures or tell you what is good for you; they make you the authority on your own life. They also match how economists usually think about welfare. And they handle the experience machine neatly, since most people want real achievements and real friends, not just the feelings of them.
Problems with raw desires
Yet desires can be mistaken. A thirsty traveler wants to drink from a glass that, unknown to him, holds poison. Getting what he wants would not make his life go better. So most desire theorists adopt an informed-desire theory: what counts is what you would want if you were fully informed and thinking clearly. That fixes the poison case.
A second problem is scope. Derek Parfit imagined meeting a stranger on a train who has a serious illness. You sincerely want him to recover, and after you part you never hear of him again. Years later, he recovers. Your desire has been fulfilled, but it seems odd to say that a fulfilled desire about a stranger made your own life go better. Desire theorists usually respond by limiting the theory to desires about one's own life, though drawing that line is hard.
A third problem is strange desires. John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice (1971), imagined a brilliant person whose only wish is to count blades of grass in parks and on lawns. If he spends his days counting and is satisfied, the desire theory says his life goes very well.
Adaptive preferences
The deepest problem is that desires are shaped by circumstances. The Norwegian theorist Jon Elster, in Sour Grapes (1983), took his title from Aesop's fox, who decided the grapes he could not reach were sour anyway. People who have little often learn to want little. Adaptive preferences are wants that shrink to fit what a person believes is available. The economist Amartya Sen pointed out that women in deeply unequal societies sometimes report no dissatisfaction with poor health or lack of schooling, because they have been taught to expect nothing else. If well-being is just satisfied desire, then a society could improve people's lives simply by lowering their hopes.
Objective list theories
Objective list theories hold that certain things are good for a person whether or not that person wants or enjoys them. Lists vary, but they often include health, knowledge, friendship and love, meaningful achievement, autonomy, play and the appreciation of beauty. The legal philosopher John Finnis, in Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980), defended seven basic goods, and Martha Nussbaum has defended a list of central human capabilities that every government should secure. The appeal is clear: such lists match what people across many cultures say a good life contains, and they give a footing for criticizing adaptive preferences.
The standard objection is that objective lists can be elitist or paternalistic, imposing one group's ideals on others. A second objection concerns explanation. If friendship is good for you even when you get nothing from it, what makes it good for you rather than just good? Critics say a list can name goods but not explain why they belong on it.
Hybrid views
Many philosophers now favor mixtures. One influential hybrid says a life goes well when a person takes pleasure in things that are actually worthwhile: neither enjoyment alone nor worthy activity alone is enough. Parfit himself was drawn to this idea. It explains why the contented grass counter seems to lack something, and also why a joyless life of great achievement seems to lack something too.
Worked example: Daniel revisited
Return to Daniel, the clerk who wants no friends and no travel. Suppose we learn that as a boy he was mocked and excluded, and decided early that wanting company only leads to hurt. A simple desire theory says his life goes well because his wants are met. An informed-desire theorist asks what he would want with full knowledge and a clear head; perhaps he would want friends after all. An objective list theorist says friendship would be good for him regardless. A hybrid theorist asks whether his crossword evenings are worthwhile and whether he truly enjoys them.
None of these views licenses forcing Daniel into a social club, since autonomy appears on nearly every list too, and respecting a person means respecting their choices. But the worry about adaptive preferences gives a reason not to take his contentment as the last word.