The Depression ended in different countries at different times, and in most of them it ended for good only when rearmament and war put everyone back to work. But the decade did not simply pass. The people who lived through it rebuilt the world economy, the role of government and even the language of rights around one resolve: never again. Many of the institutions people rely on today were designed by that generation.
A new international order
The planners who met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944 had watched the 1930s scramble of devaluations, tariff wars and frozen debts. They designed a system meant to give countries stability without the rigidity of gold. Currencies were pegged to the dollar, and the dollar to gold, but a country in deep trouble could adjust its exchange rate with international agreement instead of being forced into years of deflation. Governments were also allowed to control flows of money across their borders, so that sudden panics by foreign lenders could not wreck them as they had in 1931.
Trade got its own institution. In 1947 twenty-three countries signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which set out rounds of negotiation to bring tariffs down step by step and a rule that a trade concession to one member must be extended to all. Its designers saw the tariff war of the 1930s as a lesson in how quickly cooperation could unravel.
Security as a right
The Depression also changed ideas about what a decent society owes its members. In January 1941 Roosevelt named freedom from want among four freedoms the world should secure, and in 1944 he called for an economic bill of rights covering work, housing, medical care and education. After the war, many democracies built welfare states with pensions, unemployment insurance and public health care. In Britain, the Beveridge Report of 1942 proposed social insurance for all from birth to death.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 wrote these hopes into international language. Article 22 declares that everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security. The drafters had seen how mass poverty fed despair and dictatorship, and they treated economic security as part of human dignity, not a gift from the powerful.
New tools for governments
Inside countries, the lessons took several forms. Deposit insurance spread, and central banks accepted that in a panic they must act as lender of last resort, lending freely to sound banks. Unemployment insurance and progressive taxes became what economists call automatic stabilizers: when an economy slows, benefits rise and tax bills fall without any new law, which cushions spending. Many governments accepted Keynes's view that they should run deficits in slumps.
This consensus was itself challenged. In the 1970s, when high inflation came together with high unemployment, critics led by Milton Friedman argued that governments had overused deficit spending and that steady control of money mattered more. Debates over how much government should do, and when, never ended.
The lessons tested in 2008
In 2008 a financial crisis that began in the American housing market spread around the world. The chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, was a scholar of the Great Depression who had studied how bank failures destroy credit. Years earlier he had publicly acknowledged that the Federal Reserve bore responsibility for the 1930s and promised it would not repeat the mistake.
Governments and central banks acted quickly. They cut interest rates to near zero, lent huge sums to banks and rescued failing institutions, created money on a vast scale, and in many countries passed stimulus packages. At a summit in London in April 2009 the leaders of the Group of Twenty pledged to avoid new trade barriers. The economic historians Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O'Rourke showed that in the first year after 2008, world industrial output and trade fell as fast as or faster than after 1929. The fall was then halted within about a year, and no second Great Depression followed.
The response had critics. Many saw it as rescuing the banks that caused the crisis while millions of homeowners lost their homes, and worried that rescues teach lenders to take reckless risks. In the euro area, countries sharing one currency could not devalue, and some, like Greece, endured cuts that many economists compared with the gold standard's discipline in the 1930s.
Worked example: the political cost of crises
The Depression's deepest lesson may be political. In Germany, mass unemployment helped bring the Nazis to power. Was that an exception? In 2016 the economists Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick and Christoph Trebesch studied elections in twenty advanced democracies from 1870 to 2014. They found that after financial crises, votes for far-right parties rose by about a third on average, and parliaments became more divided, making governments harder to form. Ordinary recessions did not have the same effect.
The finding helps explain why the generation of the 1940s treated economic stability as a defense of democracy. A crisis handled badly does not only cost jobs. It can make citizens lose faith in self-government itself, and turn them toward those who promise order at the price of freedom. Understanding the 1930s is one way to recognize that danger, and to judge the leaders who claim to have the answer.
