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The Qing did not win the war with its old armies. It won with new ones, raised in the provinces by scholar-officials who had never planned to be generals. The most important of them was Zeng Guofan.

A scholar goes to war

Zeng Guofan (1811 to 1872) came from a modest landowning family in Hunan and rose through the examinations to high office in Beijing. In 1852 he was at home in mourning for his mother when the court ordered him to help organize militia against the rebels. He built something much larger: the Xiang Army, also called the Hunan Army.

Loyalty built in

Zeng studied why the regular forces failed and designed his army to fix it. Officers were mostly scholars and local gentry, men steeped in Confucian ideals of duty. Soldiers were recruited personally by officers from their own home districts, often from the same villages, so that each man knew his comrades and owed loyalty to the commander who had enlisted him. Pay was higher and more regular than in the old armies. Officers drilled their men, read them moral lectures and punished plundering, at least in principle, though discipline often broke down after a victory. Zeng also built a river fleet, because whoever controlled the Yangzi controlled the war.

The cost of this design was that loyalty ran to commanders rather than to the throne. Beijing gained an effective army but lost some control over it.

A war for civilization

In 1854 Zeng issued a proclamation against the rebels. He did not mainly call on people to defend the Manchu dynasty. Instead he presented the war as a defense of Confucian civilization itself: the rebels, he said, destroyed temples, insulted the sages, abolished family bonds and claimed that all property belonged to a foreign god. This message appealed to the educated elite of central China, Han Chinese like Zeng, who had far more to lose from a Taiping victory than from Manchu rule.

Paying for it

Armies need money, and Beijing had little to spare. A new revenue source helped fill the gap. Lijin was a tax on goods in transit, first collected in 1853 near Yangzhou and soon spread across the empire. Collected at checkpoints on roads and rivers, it was controlled largely by provincial authorities, who used it to pay their troops. It outlived the war by decades and gave provincial leaders a source of funds that Beijing did not fully control.

Slow and steady

Zeng suffered early defeats; after one in 1854 he tried to drown himself and was pulled from the water. He learned patience. His strategy was to advance slowly, taking river cities one by one, digging in, cutting supply lines and never risking his army in a single decisive battle. Wuchang was retaken in 1856, and the Hunan Army worked its way down the Yangzi toward Nanjing.

The key was Anqing, a walled city upriver from Nanjing. Anqing guarded the Yangzi approach to Nanjing from the west, and whoever held it could move men and boats downriver. Zeng's brother Zeng Guoquan besieged it from 1860. In September 1861 Anqing fell to Zeng Guoquan's siege army, and the garrison and many inhabitants were killed.

After the Qing camp at Nanjing collapsed in 1860, the court gave Zeng command of the whole campaign in the lower Yangzi. He sent trusted protégés to open new fronts. The Huai Army was a force Li Hongzhang raised in Anhui, modeled on the Hunan Army, and in 1862 it was carried by steamer to defend Shanghai. Zuo Zongtang led another army into Zhejiang.

The other face of victory

Zeng's admirers praise his self-discipline, his letters on moral cultivation and his loyalty. His critics point to mass executions of suspected rebels in Hunan and to massacres after the fall of rebel cities. He also wrote a stream of letters to his brothers and sons urging diligence, frugality and humility, later published and widely read. Both pictures are true. The Qing counterattack was as merciless as the rebellion it fought.

Worked example: the siege of Anqing

The Taiping understood what Anqing meant. In 1861 they planned a pincer: Chen Yucheng would march north of the Yangzi and Li Xiucheng south of it, converging on Wuhan far upriver to force Zeng to lift the siege. Chen got close to Hankou in March 1861. There a British consul, Harry Parkes, warned him that an attack would harm British trade in the newly opened treaty port. Chen turned back. Li Xiucheng arrived late and then moved off.

Meanwhile Zeng Guoquan kept his men digging. His siege lines had two sets of trenches, one facing the city and one facing outward against relief armies. When Chen Yucheng returned to break the siege, his attacks failed against these lines. Anqing starved and fell. The case shows three things that decided the war: Zeng's patience and logistics, the Taiping leaders' failure to coordinate, and the quiet weight of foreign interests even when no foreign soldier fired a shot.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. How were soldiers of the Hunan Army recruited?
2. Who were most of the Hunan Army's officers?
3. How did the Hunan Army's founder present the war in 1854?
4. What was lijin?
5. What strategy did the Hunan Army follow?
6. Why did Anqing matter so much?
7. What happened at Anqing in September 1861?
8. What was the Huai Army?

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