The generals expected a quick seizure of power, the kind of pronunciamiento Spain had seen many times before. What they got was a war of nearly three years.
The rising
The rising began in Spanish Morocco on the afternoon of 17 July 1936 and spread to mainland garrisons on 18 and 19 July. General Franco, posted to the Canary Islands, flew to Morocco in a chartered British aircraft to take command of the Army of Africa, the hardened colonial force of legionaries and Moroccan regular troops. In Navarre, Mola could count on thousands of Carlist militiamen, the requetés, devoted to religion and a traditionalist monarchy. The intended leader of the whole movement, General Sanjurjo, died when his plane crashed on takeoff in Portugal on 20 July.
A country split in two
The coup succeeded in roughly a third of Spain and failed in the rest, including the capital and the main industrial cities. The rebels took Galicia, much of Old Castile and León, Navarre, western Aragon, the Balearic Islands except Menorca, the Canaries and Morocco, along with a few southern cities. In Madrid, crowds and loyal troops stormed the Montaña barracks on 20 July. The outcome in each place depended on whether local commanders, the Civil Guard and the Assault Guards stayed loyal, and on how quickly workers organized.
The government of José Giral made a fateful decision: it handed out rifles to the workers' parties and unions, since much of the army could not be trusted. That choice saved the Republic in many cities, but it also shifted real power to the organizations that now had armed militias.
Revolution behind the lines
Across much of Republican Spain, especially Catalonia and Aragon, a social revolution followed. Committees of the CNT and the UGT took over factories, trams, telephones, hotels and shops. In Aragon hundreds of villages formed agrarian collectives in which the land was worked in common, some abolishing money in favor of vouchers. Some collectives were voluntary and admired; in others, smallholders were pushed in under militia pressure. In Catalonia a Central Committee of Antifascist Militias for a time held more real power than the regional government. Visitors described Barcelona as a city run by its workers, where no one dared to look rich. Women joined the militias in the first weeks, and a new anarchist women's organization, Mujeres Libres, campaigned for women's education and independence, although by the end of 1936 the authorities were pulling women back from the front lines.
Terror on both sides
The first months brought mass killing in both zones, and it must be stated plainly. In the Republican zone, militias and self-appointed patrols took people on "rides" from which they did not return. The Church suffered most: nearly 6,800 priests, monks and nuns were killed, one of the worst outbreaks of anticlerical violence in European history. In November and December 1936, prisoners taken from Madrid's jails were shot at Paracuellos and nearby villages, perhaps two thousand or more. Most historians put the killings in the Republican zone during the war at roughly 50,000, and Republican authorities gradually brought the violence under control.
In the rebel zone, killing was organized as policy. Mola's instructions called for extreme violence against the enemy, and repression was directed by military authorities rather than arising mainly from the collapse of order. Union members, Republican mayors, teachers and freemasons were shot. When the Army of Africa took Badajoz on 14 August 1936, its troops carried out mass executions, many in the bullring. In August the poet Federico García Lorca was shot by rebels near Granada. Estimates of rebel killings during the war commonly exceed 100,000, with many more after it ended. Numbers on both sides remain uncertain, and research in local archives keeps revising them.
Worked example: Barcelona and Seville
Two cities show how much the first hours mattered. In Seville, General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, with only a few hundred soldiers at first, arrested the local commanders on 18 July, turned artillery on the working-class districts and took Andalusia's capital. He then used nightly radio broadcasts to spread terror and false reports of victory. In Barcelona, on 19 July, rebel troops marched out of their barracks but met armed workers of the CNT, together with Assault Guards and, crucially, the Civil Guard, which stayed loyal to the Catalan government. By the next day the rising there had been crushed, and the rebel general Manuel Goded had been captured.
The comparison teaches a basic lesson about coups: they depend less on weapons than on the choices of thousands of individuals. Police officers, junior officers and union members each decided whether to obey, resist or wait. The sum of those decisions in July 1936 fixed the map of the war for months. It also explains the different character of the two zones. Where the coup failed because workers fought, power passed to the street; where it succeeded, a military command took over and treated the population as conquered territory.
