From September 1814 to June 1815 the rulers and diplomats of Europe gathered in Vienna to put a continent back together. They danced at balls, quarreled over maps, and nearly went to war with each other. The settlement they made has been praised as one of the most successful peaces in modern history and condemned as a conspiracy of kings against their peoples. Both judgments contain truth.
The negotiators
The host was Austria's foreign minister, Prince Klemens von Metternich, who believed that revolution and nationalism threatened the very existence of a multinational empire like his. Britain sent its foreign secretary, Viscount Castlereagh, who wanted a balance of power that would keep any one state from dominating the continent. Tsar Alexander I came in person, mixing religious idealism with ambition for Poland. Prussia was represented by its chancellor, Karl August von Hardenberg. Defeated France sent Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, a former bishop who had served both the revolution and Napoleon. He skilfully used quarrels among the victors to win France a seat at the main table.
The peacemakers did not punish France harshly at first. The first Treaty of Paris, in May 1814, gave it roughly its borders of 1792. After the Hundred Days a second treaty, in November 1815, reduced it to the borders of 1790 and imposed an indemnity and an army of occupation, but left the country whole.
Principles
Three ideas guided the talks. Legitimacy, a principle Talleyrand championed, meant restoring rightful dynasties, such as the Bourbons in France, Spain and Naples. The balance of power meant that no state should be strong enough to overwhelm the others. Compensation meant that a state giving up territory in one place should be rewarded elsewhere. These ideas often conflicted, and where they did, the interests of the great powers usually won.
The Saxon crisis and the new map
The most dangerous quarrel concerned Poland and Saxony. Alexander wanted most of the Duchy of Warsaw as a Polish kingdom under himself; Prussia wanted all of Saxony, whose king had stayed loyal to Napoleon, in return. Austria and Britain feared both demands. In January 1815 Britain, Austria and France signed a secret defensive treaty against Russia and Prussia, and for a few weeks war among the victors seemed possible. A compromise followed: Russia took most of Poland, and Prussia took about two-fifths of Saxony.
The Final Act, signed on 9 June 1815, nine days before Waterloo, redrew Europe. Prussia gained the Rhineland and Westphalia, placing it on France's border and in possession of what would become Germany's industrial heartland. Austria gained Lombardy and Venetia in northern Italy. The former Austrian Netherlands were joined to the Dutch to form a Kingdom of the Netherlands as a barrier against France. Germany became a German Confederation of thirty-nine states, with a federal assembly at Frankfurt presided over by Austria. Switzerland's permanent neutrality was recognized. Britain kept colonies such as the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon.
More than borders
The congress also produced rules that outlasted its map. A declaration of February 1815 condemned the Atlantic slave trade as "repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality," though it set no date for ending it. Rules on diplomatic rank ended centuries of quarrels over precedence by ranking ambassadors by length of service. Free navigation on international rivers such as the Rhine was proclaimed and placed under a commission.
The Concert of Europe
In September 1815 Alexander persuaded the monarchs of Austria and Prussia to join a Holy Alliance, pledging to rule by Christian principles. Castlereagh privately called it "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense." More practical was the Quadruple Alliance of November 1815, by which Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia agreed to meet periodically to keep the peace. France joined in 1818. This habit of great powers consulting one another is known as the Concert of Europe.
The eastern powers soon used it against revolution. At Troppau in 1820 Austria, Prussia and Russia claimed a right to intervene against revolutionary governments, and Austrian troops crushed a constitutional regime in Naples in 1821. In 1823 a French army restored Ferdinand VII's absolute rule in Spain. Britain refused to back such interventions, and the system of regular congresses faded in the 1820s, though the great powers kept consulting in crises.
Worked example: was Vienna a good peace?
Defenders point to results. No war involving all the great powers broke out again until 1914, and none among any of the five until the Crimean War of 1853. Henry Kissinger, writing in the 1950s, admired the settlement for creating an order the major powers accepted as legitimate, so that none wished to overthrow it. The historian Paul Schroeder later argued that Vienna transformed European politics by replacing a ruthless struggle for advantage with shared habits of restraint and consultation.
Critics answer that peoples were handed around like property. Poles, Italians, Belgians and Norwegians were placed under rulers they had not chosen, and promises of constitutions and of rights for Jews in German cities were broken. Both views can hold at once. A settlement can succeed at preventing war between states while failing the people who live inside them, and the revolts of 1820, 1830 and 1848 were in part the bill for that failure.
