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In October 1911 Madero won the presidency in what many historians consider one of the freest elections Mexico had yet held. For fifteen months the country enjoyed something it had rarely known: a free press, a Congress with real debates, and open political clubs. Newspapers mocked the new president mercilessly, and he let them. Yet his government ended in murder, and the reasons say a great deal about how hard it is to build a democracy on top of an unreformed old order.

Zapata's demand

In Morelos the villagers who had fought for Madero expected their lands back. Zapata told Madero, in a meeting in the capital in 1911, that the villages would not disarm until the land question was settled. Madero urged patience and legal procedures. Meanwhile the interim government of León de la Barra sent federal troops to Morelos under General Victoriano Huerta, who launched a campaign against the Zapatistas in 1911 even while negotiations were under way.

In November 1911, a few weeks after Madero took office, Zapata and the schoolteacher Otilio Montaño issued the Plan of Ayala. The Plan of Ayala declared Madero a traitor to the revolution and named Pascual Orozco as its chief. It demanded that villages recover the lands, woods and waters taken from them, by taking possession at once and leaving the haciendas to prove their claims in court afterward. It also called for one third of the great estates to be expropriated, with compensation, for people who had no land at all, and for the property of anyone who opposed the plan to be seized. The plan turned a local quarrel over fields and water into a national program, and its rallying cry of land and liberty, borrowed from the Flores Magón brothers, became the revolution's most famous phrase.

The government answered with force. In 1912 General Juvencio Robles burned villages and forcibly relocated their people, which only drove more families into Zapata's army.

Rebellions from left and right

In the north, Pascual Orozco felt cheated. He had won the key victory at Ciudad Juárez, yet Madero passed him over for high office. In March 1912 Orozco rebelled against Madero, with money from the great Chihuahua landowning families who had their own reasons to hate the new government. Huerta defeated him. During the campaign Huerta accused Pancho Villa of insubordination and ordered him shot; Madero commuted the sentence, and Villa later escaped from jail to Texas.

In October 1912 Félix Díaz, the old dictator's nephew, led a revolt in Veracruz that collapsed within days. Madero spared his life, as he had spared Villa's, a habit of mercy that struck many as weakness.

The Tragic Ten Days

On 9 February 1913, officers in Mexico City freed Félix Díaz and General Bernardo Reyes, another rival, from prison and marched on the National Palace. Reyes was killed in the first assault. The rebels then occupied an arsenal called the Ciudadela, and for ten days artillery duels pounded the center of the capital, killing hundreds of civilians. This is remembered as the Decena Trágica, the Tragic Ten Days, of February 1913.

Madero had placed Huerta in charge of defending the government. Huerta secretly changed sides. The American ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, brokered the Pact of the Embassy, an agreement between Huerta and Félix Díaz signed in the United States embassy, under which Huerta would become president. Wilson had long despised Madero and believed a strongman would protect American interests.

Madero and his vice president, José María Pino Suárez, were arrested and forced to resign. To give the takeover a legal look, the foreign minister, Pedro Lascuráin, became president under the constitutional order of succession, served for less than an hour, appointed Huerta to the cabinet, and resigned so that Huerta could succeed him. On the night of 22 February 1913 Madero and Pino Suárez were shot while supposedly being moved to prison. The official claim of a rescue attempt fooled almost no one.

Worked example: Madero's dilemma

Why did the first democratic government of the revolution fail? One answer blames Madero's character: he was naive, trusted the wrong men and could not see Huerta's betrayal coming. That is too simple.

A deeper answer looks at his position. Madero had promised legality. That meant changing land ownership only through courts and laws, which would take years, while villagers wanted their fields now. It meant keeping the federal army, whose officers had served Díaz and loathed the revolutionaries. It meant tolerating a press and a Congress where his enemies attacked him daily. Each commitment was democratic in itself. Together, they left him with impatient allies on one side and armed, organized enemies on the other, with no force of his own to rely on.

The case shows that free elections and a free press, though essential, do not by themselves make a democracy secure. If the army, the courts and the wealthy remain loyal to the old order, and if those who fought for change see no change in their daily lives, a democratic government can be squeezed from both sides. The question for any new democracy is how to keep its promises of legality while making enough real change, quickly enough, that ordinary people believe it is theirs.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. Who led federal troops against the Zapatistas in 1911?
2. Whom did the Plan of Ayala name as chief of the revolution?
3. What share of the great estates did the Plan of Ayala seek to expropriate?
4. Who paid for Orozco's rebellion of 1912?
5. Who brokered the Pact of the Embassy in 1913?
6. What was the Decena Trágica?
7. How long did Pedro Lascuráin serve as president?
8. What happened to Madero on the night of 22 February 1913?

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